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Is Strict Liability the Answer in the
Battle against Foreign Corporate
Bribery?
“A corporate culture that permits its employees to corrupt public
officials ends up corrupting itself.”1
INTRODUCTION
In February of 1975, Eli M. Black, the CEO of United
Brands Company, jumped from the 44th floor of his New York
City office building.2 Black’s jump followed the government’s
discovery that he authorized a $1.25 million bribe to Honduran
Chief of State General Oswaldo López Arellano to obtain
reduced shipment taxes on the exportation of bananas.3 Four
months later, in response to a Honduran investigation, both the
Honduran president and Arellano resigned from their positions.4
Although the scandal brought some of the negative effects of
foreign bribery to the general public’s attention,5 it did not deter
modern day companies from mimicking United Brand’s actions.
For example, from 2000 to 2007, Delaware manufacturer
Innospec paid over $6 million to foreign government officials to
secure the sale of a gasoline lead additive in Iraq and Indonesia.6
1 William M. Hannay, Designing an Effective FCPA and Anti-Bribery
Compliance Program, in 12 CORP. COMPLIANCE SERIES 5 (2013).
2 The Inductees: Eli Black, CON ARTISTS HALL OF INFAMY,
http://www.thehallofinfamy.org/inductees.php?action=detail&artist=eli_black (last
visited Jan. 12, 2014).
3 Honduras: A Genuine Banana Coup, TIME, May 5, 1975,
http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,913028,00.html; see also Matthew
J. Kovacich, Comment, Backyard Business Going Global: The Consequences of
Increased Enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA”) on Minnesota &
Wisconsin, 32 HAMLINE L. REV. 529, 531 (2009); The Inductees: Eli Black, supra note 2.
4 Kovacich, supra note 3,Honduras: A Genuine Banana Coup, supra note 3.
5 Wrestling with Reform: Financial Scandals and the Legislation They
Inspired: Three Approaches, One Law: Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, SEC. &
EXCH. COMM’N HISTORICAL SOC’Y, http://www.sechistorical.org/museum/galleries/wwr/
wwr04a-three-illicit.php (last visited Apr. 5, 2014).
6 Complaint at 1-2, SEC v. Innospec, Inc., No. 1:10-cv-00448 (D.D.C. Mar.
18, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2010/comp21454.pdf;
see also Elizabeth K. Spahn, Multijurisdictional Bribery Law Enforcement: The OECD
Anti-Bribery Convention, 53 VA. J. INT’L L. 1, 32 (2012).
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Unable to sell the lead-based product in the U.S. and Europe
after the enactment of the Clean Air Act, Innospec targeted new
markets.7 Innospec not only bribed foreign officials to secure
contracts for sales of the additive, but also created a separate
corporate fund in hopes of bribing legislators to delay the
adoption of clean air regulations elsewhere.8 Simultaneously,
pharmaceutical giant Pfizer, Inc. made frequent improper
payments to foreign officials in Bulgaria, China, Croatia, Italy,
Kazakhstan, Russia, Serbia, and the Czech Republic to obtain
regulatory approval of pharmaceuticals, avoid customs
requirements, and influence purchasing decisions in various
hospitals.9 Pfizer earned over $16 million in aggregate profits as
a result of these bribes.10 Numerous other cases, analogous to
Innospec and Pfizer, exemplify the reality that, despite well-
known consequences, bribery of foreign officials remains “a $1
trillion industry.”11 Battling this corruption today is “one of the
world’s greatest challenges.”12
Not only does a world full of unchecked bribery facilitate
an environment conducive to other criminal activities,13 but it
slows economic growth worldwide. The battle against corruption
diverts resources from health, education, and infrastructure14
and adds “10% or more to the costs of doing business” globally.15
For individual corporations, such corruption not only
distorts competition and accurate pricing, but also puts bribing
companies at risk of legal action, monetary loss, and
7 Complaint at 1-2, SEC v. Innospec, Inc., No. 1:10-cv-00448; see also Spahn,
supra note 6, at 32.
8 Press Release, Serious Fraud Office, Innospec Limited Prosecuted for
Corruption by the SFO (Mar. 18, 2010), available at http://www.sfo.gov.uk/press-
room/press-release-archive/press-releases-2010/innospec-limited-prosecuted-for-
corruption-by-the-sfo.aspx.
9 Complaint at 1-2, SEC v. Pfizer, Inc., No. 1:12-cv-01303 (D.D.C. Aug. 7, 2012),
available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2012/comp-pr2012-152-pfizer.pdf.
10 Id. at 19.
11 Daniel Kaufmann, Corruption—Can it Ever be Controlled?, WORLD BANK,
http://live.worldbank.org/corruption-can-it-ever-be-controlled (last visited Mar. 15, 2014).
12 Hannay, supra note 1, at 5 (quoting Transparency and Anti-Corruption,
Principle 10: “Business Should Work Against Corrpution in All Its Forms, Including
Extortion and Bribery,” UN GLOBAL COMPACT, http://www.unglobalcompact.org/
AboutTheGC/TheTenPrinciples/anti-corruption.html (last visited Apr. 5, 2014)).
13 CRIMINAL DIV. OF THE U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & ENFORCEMENT DIV. OF THE
U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, A RESOURCE GUIDE TO THE U.S. FOREIGN CORRUPT
PRACTICES ACT 2-3 (2012), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/
guide.pdf [hereinafter RESOURCEGUIDE].
14 Id. at 2.
15 Hannay, supra note 1, at 6 (quoting Transparency and Anti-Corruption,
Principle 10: “Business Should Work Against Corruption in All Its Forms, Including
Extortion and Bribery,” UN GLOBAL COMPACT, http://www.unglobalcompact.org/
AboutTheGC/TheTenPrinciples/anti-corruption.html (last visited Apr. 5, 2014)).
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reputational harm.16 Moreover, corrupt actions by management
engender a corporate culture where employees believe it is
permissible to engage in other forms of misconduct, including
“employee self-dealing, embezzlement, financial fraud, and anti-
competitive behavior.”17 Consequently, a company contributing
to foreign bribery simultaneously “undermines [its] own long-
term interests.”18 It naturally follows that laws prohibiting
paying bribes to public officials to secure or further corporate
relationships are “an increasingly important part of the legal
framework in which modern corporations operate.”19
In the United States, the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
(FCPA) governs corrupt actions by individuals and companies.
The FCPA creates both criminal and civil liability for those
engaging in the bribery of foreign officials.20 The law “represents
an attempt to ensure that American businesses operate with
integrity abroad and do not exploit business opportunities in
foreign lands with their deep pockets.”21 Although unique at its
inception, today, the FCPA is but a single statute in a world
increasingly full of laws and conventions dedicated to battling
bribery of foreign officials.22
A recent rise in FCPA enforcement, coupled with a
growing web of international anti-bribery legislation, puts
FCPA compliance at “the forefront of most boards’ agendas.”23
This increased presence in the corporate boardroom leads
“many influential members of the business community to push
for [statutory] reform.”24 The current reform debate is between
those arguing for maintenance of current enforcement trends
and those arguing for reform of the law’s ambiguous language
and enforcement methods.25 Common complaints by U.S.
corporations pushing for reform focus on the ambiguity
surrounding the meaning of “corrupt intent,” the uncertainty
16 Id.
17 RESOURCEGUIDE, supra note 13, at 3 (footnotes omitted).
18 Id.
19 Hannay, supra note 1, at 3.
20 See RESOURCEGUIDE, supra note 13, at 4-5.
21 Kovacich, supra note 3, at 531.
22 Gwendolyn L. Hassan, The Increasing Risk of Multijurisdictional Bribery
Prosecution: Why Having an FCPA Compliance Program is No Longer Enough, 42 INT’L L.
NEWS 1 (2013), available at http://www.americanbar.org/publications/international_law_news/
2013/winter/the_increasing_risk_multijurisdictional_bribery_prosecution_why_having_fc
pa_compliance_program_no_longer_enough.html.
23 Joseph W. Yockey, Choosing Governance in the FCPA Reform Debate, 38 J.
CORP. L. 325, 332 (2013).
24 Id.
25 Id. at 332, 338.
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surrounding corporate cooperation, and the overall impact of
the FCPA on a company’s ability to compete internationally.26
Moreover, as international anti-bribery legislation
becomes increasingly prevalent, some advocate for greater
consistency in global legislation.27 As FCPA enforcement
increases alongside international legislative efforts, the FCPA’s
provisions are becoming increasingly scrutinized by American
companies, in large part led by the United States Chamber of
Commerce (USCOC). These companies are demanding that the
government clarify various FCPA terms or scale back on
enforcement.28 However, while the costs of corruption are no
less severe, advocates for reform should not focus on scaling
back FCPA enforcement, but rather on removing part of the
FCPA’s ambiguity, such as the requirement of “corrupt intent”
for corporate violations. By removing the corrupt intent
standard, the government would provide clarification assuaging
legitimate complaints about ambiguity, while simultaneously
maintaining heightened enforcement. This note argues that
Congress should amend the FCPA to not only reflect the
current anti-bribery environment around the globe, but to
avoid future enforcement obstacles stemming from a newly
heightened focus on the statute’s ambiguous terms. Creating
strict corporate liability under the FCPA not only allows for
sustainable, increased enforcement, but such an amendment
would provide an unambiguous standard for U.S. companies.
Part I of this note describes the history of the FCPA, the
essential elements of its anti-bribery provisions, the recent
pattern of increased enforcement, and the ambiguity
surrounding “corrupt intent.” Part II introduces the FCPA
“reform debate” between groups calling for statutory
clarification and reduced enforcement and those arguing that
the costs of foreign bribery demand maintenance of the status
quo. Part III explores recent trends in international anti-
bribery legislation and specifically highlights elements of
26 See, e.g., PUBLIC CITIZEN, LICENSE TO BRIBE: HOW THE U.S. CHAMBER OF
COMMERCE’S FIGHT TO WEAKEN ANTI-CORRUPTION LAW THREATENS THE GLOBAL
ECONOMY, SMALL BUSINESS, AND DEMOCRACY 12 (2013); Letter from U.S. Chamber of
Commerce et al. to Lanny A. Breuer, Assistant Att’y Gen. & George S. Canellos, Acting
Dir. of Enforcement, SEC 1, 2, 5 (Feb. 19, 2013), available at http://www.ethic-
intelligence.com/images/documents/legislation_reference_texts/2013_Coalition_Letter_t
o_DOJ_and_SEC_re_Guidance.pdf [hereinafter USCOC Letter].
27 Misty Robinson, Global Approach to Anti-Bribery and Corruption, An
Overview: Much Done, But a Lot More to Do . . . , 37 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 303, 320
(2012) (“Scholars suggest that globalization has birth[ed] a new category of problems
that can only be addressed on a global scale . . . .”).
28 Yockey, supra note 23, at 337-38; USCOC Letter, supra note 26.
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Brazil’s Clean Companies Act. Part IV proposes that Brazil’s
Clean Companies Act should serve as an appropriate model for
FCPA reform and argues that strict corporate liability for
FCPA offenses will adequately deter foreign bribery by U.S.
companies and effectively promote the intent behind the FCPA.
I. INTRODUCTION TO THE FCPA
A. The History of the FCPA
The FCPA can thank its existence to the Watergate
scandal. In the 1970s, the Watergate special prosecutor
uncovered U.S. companies making illegal contributions to the
1972 Nixon reelection campaign and paying substantial bribes
to secure business abroad.29 The discovery prompted the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to undertake an
investigation and voluntary disclosure program, focusing on
“possible management misuse of corporate funds and concealment
of improper payments.”30 Following this investigation, on May
14, 1976, the SEC provided the U.S. Senate with a report
containing an analysis of “illegal or questionable foreign
payments” made by U.S. companies.31
The report provided that U.S. companies were spending
millions of dollars to secure business contracts by bribing
foreign officials.32 Over 400 U.S. corporations, 117 of them
Fortune 500 companies, “admitted making questionable or
illegal payments.”33 Many of these payments were “well in
excess of $300 million.”34 To “restore public confidence” in the
business community, Congress passed the FCPA in 1977.35 The
FCPA created both criminal and civil liability for companies
bribing foreign officials36 to either obtain or retain business.37
29 Hannay, supra note 1, at 8; see also GEORGE C. GREANIAS & DUANE
WINDSOR, THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT: ANATOMY OF A STATUTE 17 (1982).
30 GREANIAS&WINDSOR, supra note 29, at 19.
31 SEC, REPORT OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION ON
QUESTIONABLE AND ILLEGAL CORPORATE PAYMENTS AND PRACTICES 1 (1976), available at
http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/fcpa/sec-report-questionable-illegal-corporate-payments-
practices-1976.pdf [hereinafter SEC REPORT].
32 SEC REPORT, supra note 31, at 5.
33 H.R. REP. No. 95-640, at 4 (1977), available at http://www.justice.gov/
criminal/fraud/fcpa/history/1977/houseprt-95-640.pdf.
34 Id.; see also S. REP. No 95-114, at 3 (1977), available at http://www.justice.gov/
criminal/fraud/fcpa/history/1977/senaterpt-95-114.pdf.
35 RESOURCEGUIDE, supra note 13, at 2.
36 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(a) (2012). The FCPA also contains accounting
provisions, requiring issuers of securities listed on any U.S. stock exchange to “make
and keep books, records, and accounts, which, in reasonable detail, accurately and
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Congress amended the FCPA in 1988 to allow for affirmative
defenses38 and again in 1998 to expand the law’s authority and
territorial jurisdiction.39
B. An Overview of the FCPA
The anti-bribery provisions of the FCPA prohibit issuers,40
domestic concerns,41 and other persons operating within a U.S.
territory42 from corruptly “offering to pay, paying, promising to
pay, or authorizing the payment of money or anything of value” to
certain individuals to influence actions or decisions made “in an
official capacity”43 or “to secure any other improper advantage in
order to obtain or retain business.”44 The prohibited improper
conduct applies to actions involving foreign officials, foreign
political parties or officials, candidates for foreign political office,
or “any person[ ] while knowing that all or a portion of” what is
given will go to a foreign official.45 Both the Department of Justice
(DOJ) and the SEC enforce the provisions.46
fairly reflect the transactions and dispositions of the assets of the issuer”; however, this
note only addresses the anti-bribery provisions. See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(A).
37 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(a) (for issuers); 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(a) (for domestic
concerns); 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-3(a) (for others while in U.S. territory); see also RESOURCE
GUIDE, supra note 13, at 2.
38 From its inception, FCPA critics claimed the act severely disadvantaged U.S.
companies operating in international markets when forced to compete with foreign
companies not subject to restrictions on bribery. To alleviate this concern, Congress added
two affirmative defenses to FCPA liability. See James A. Barta & Julia Chapman,
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 49 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 825, 826 (2012); infra Part 1.B.1.
39 RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 13, at 3-4 (noting that Congress hoped the
expansion of the FCPA’s territorial jurisdiction would spur similar anti-corruption
movements internationally).
40 An “issuer” is a company with securities traded on a U.S. stock exchanges.
15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(a).
41 Domestic concerns are individuals that are “citizen[s], national[s] or resident[s]
of the U.S.” or “any corporation, partnership, association, joint-stock company, business
trust, unincorporated organization, or sole proprietorship which has its principal place of
business in the [U.S.], or which is organized under [U.S.] laws.” Id. § 78dd-2(h)(1).
42 This includes “any natural person other than a [U.S.] national . . . or any
corporation, partnership, association, joint-stock company, business trust, unincorporated
organization, or sole proprietorship organized under the law of a foreign nation” who is
acting while in the territory of the U.S. Id. § 78dd-3(f)(1).
43 Decisions made in an official capacity are made “for or on behalf of any [ ]
government or department, agency, or instrumentality, or for or on behalf of any [ ]
public international organization.” Id. § (f)(2)(A).
44 RESOURCEGUIDE, supra note 13, at 10.
45 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(a)(3) (for issuers); id. § 78dd-2(a)(3) (for domestic
concerns); id. § 78dd-3(a)(3) (for others operating within U.S. territory) (emphasis added).
Congress provides that “knowing” refers not only to actual knowledge but also includes
willful blindness or “those who purposefully avoid actual knowledge.” RESOURCE GUIDE,
supra note 13, at 22. Although the FCPA defines “foreign official” as “any officer or
employee of a foreign government or any department, agency, or instrumentality thereof,
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1. Exceptions and Affirmative Defenses to FCPA
Liability
There is one statutory exception and two statutory
affirmative defenses to FCPA liability.47 Under the “routine
governmental action” exception, payments to foreign officials to
expedite routine governmental actions are exempt from FCPA
liability.48 Routine governmental actions include the
procurement of permits or licenses, processing governmental
papers, and other actions that are “ordinarily and commonly
performed by a foreign official.”49 Such payments are not
protected, however, if they encourage a foreign official “to award
new business or to continue business with a particular party.”50
The first affirmative defense applies if an individual or
entity is acting lawfully “under the written laws and
regulations of the foreign official’s . . . country.”51 The second
affirmative defense provides for no liability for payments that
are “reasonable and bona fide expenditure[s],” directly related
to the “promotion, demonstration, or explanation of products or
services,” or “the execution or performance of a contract with a
foreign government or agency thereof.”52 Acceptable
expenditures include, but are not limited to, “travel and
expenses to visit company facilities or operations,” as well as
or of a public international organization, or any person acting in an official capacity for or
on behalf of any such government department, agency, or instrumentality, or for or on
behalf of any such public international organization,” the term is criticized as ambiguous.
See USCOC Letter, supra note 26, at 3 (discussing 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(f)(1)(A) (for
issuers), 78dd-2(h)(2)(A) (for domestic concerns), 78dd-3(f)(2)(A) (for others operating
within U.S. territory).
46 RESOURCEGUIDE, supra note 13, at 4-5.
47 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(b), (c) (for issuers); id. § 78dd-2(b), (c) (for domestic
concerns); id. § 78dd-3(b), (c) (for others operating within U.S. territory).
48 Id. § 78dd-1(b) (for issuers); id. § 78dd-2(b) (for domestic concerns); id.
§ 78dd-3(b) (for others operating within U.S. territory).
49 Id. § 78dd-1(f)(3)(a) (for issuers); id. § 78dd-2(h)(4)(a) (for domestic concerns);
id. § 78dd-3(f)(4)(b) (for others operating within U.S. territory).
50 Id. §§ 78dd-1(f)(3)(B), 78dd-2(h)(4)(B), 78dd-3(f)(4)(B). Congress intended this
exception to be very narrow. See United States v. Kay, 359 F.3d 738, 751 (5th Cir. 2004)
(discussing the broad scope of activities prohibited by the FCPA and highlighting a
limited exception for “lobbying or other normal representations to government officials”);
United States v. Kozeny, 493 F. Supp. 2d 693, 697-98, 713 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (finding that
payments to secure the privatization of state owned enterprises were not the kind of
legitimate payments Congress intended to fit within the exception).
51 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(c) (for issuers); 78dd-2(c) (for domestic concerns); 78dd-
3(c) (for others operating within U.S. territory).
52 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(c) (for issuers); 78dd-2(c) (for domestic concerns); 78dd-
3(c) (for others operating within U.S. territory).
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expenses related to “product demonstration[s] or promotional
activities” such as promotional meetings.53
2. The Benefit of Compliance Programs and Self-
Reporting
Both the SEC and DOJ claim that, although not a formal
defense, they will “consider the adequacy of a company’s
compliance program when deciding what, if any, [FCPA-related]
action to take.”54 The extent of this consideration is unclear,
however, as neither agency provides a model compliance program
template or a clear explanation as to what benefit, if any, a
company actually receives for implementing a compliance
system.55 The DOJ and SEC additionally claim to place a “high
premium” on companies who self-report FCPA violations,
cooperate with FCPA investigations, or bolster FCPA compliance
as a remedial measure during investigations.56 Like the use of
extensive compliance programs, however, many companies argue
that the benefits of self-reporting are “illusory” at best.57
3. Penalties for Anti-Bribery Violations
The FCPA provides for civil and criminal penalties for
both individuals and business entities,58 though this note focuses
solely on business entity liability. For anti-bribery violations,
businesses face criminal fines up to $2 million and civil penalties
up to $10,000.59 In certain circumstances, a company may incur
an aggravated fine up to twice the benefit that the company
sought to obtain by making a corrupt payment. 60
“General principles of corporate liability [also] apply to
FCPA liability.”61 This means that “a company is liable when its
directors, officers, employees, or agents, acting within the scope
of their employment, commit FCPA violations intended, at least
53 RESOURCEGUIDE, supra note 13, at 24.
54 Id. at 56.
55 USCOC Letter, supra note 26, at 2.
56 RESOURCEGUIDE, supra note 13, at 54.
57 Yockey, supra note 23, at 336 (noting that several firms cooperating during
FCPA investigations still “paid jaw-dropping sums to settle” the charges); see also
USCOC Letter, supra note 26, at 2.
58 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(g) (2012).
59 Id.
60 See RESOURCEGUIDE, supra note 13, at 69.
61 Id. at 27; see, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(g).
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in part, to benefit the company.”62 Under the current version of
the FCPA, the DOJ or SEC must prove an employee’s or agent’s
“corrupt intent” before imposing liability on the company.63 If
“corrupt intent” is established, a company is vicariously liable
regardless of whether “the employee violate[d] express
instructions or existing compliance requirements.”64
C. Increased Enforcement Trends
During the 30 years following the FCPA’s enactment,
enforcement was virtually non-existent. This vacuum
encouraged companies to conduct business as usual, indifferent
to the FCPA and its prohibitions.65 In fact, “[b]etween 1978 and
2000, the SEC and the [DOJ] together averaged only three
prosecutions per year.”66 Any restraint shown by regulators,
however, is now a thing of the past. For example, in 2011, 2012,
and 2013, partially as a result of the implementation of
Sarbanes-Oxley and an increasingly global marketplace, the
SEC and DOJ together brought 48, 23, and 27 enforcement
actions, respectively.67 Of those actions, 37 were against
corporate entities as opposed to individuals.68
The penalties companies received have also significantly
increased.69 In 2013 alone, the DOJ and SEC collected over
$720 million in penalties against corporations, averaging $80
million per corporation charged.70 From 2010 through 2012, the
62 RESOURCEGUIDE, supra note 13, at 27; see also Yockey, supra note 23, at 335
(noting that corporations are vicariously liable for the actions of employees within the
scope of their employment who are motivated to serve the interests of the corporation).
63 RESOURCEGUIDE, supra note 13, at 27.
64 Yockey, supra note 23, at 335. In addition to corporate liability, the “principles
of parent-subsidiary and successor liability” also apply to FCPA violations. RESOURCE
GUIDE, supra note 13, at 27. Parent companies can be held liable under parent-subsidiary
liability for a subsidiary’s actions if the parent “participate[s] sufficiently [enough] in the
activity” to warrant direct liability or “under traditional agency principles.” Id. at 27.
Liability may also incur under principles of successor liability to a corporation acquiring a
company that engaged in acts violating the FCPA prior to the acquisition. Id. at 28.
65 See Barta & Chapman, supra note 38, at 827-28.
66 Id.
67 Sharie A. Brown & Brian S. Chilton, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 11
BRIEFLY . . . PERSP. ON LEGIS. REG., & LITIG. 1, 3 (2007); GIBSON DUNN, 2013 YEAR-END
FCPA UPDATE 2 (2014), available at http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/
Documents/2013-Year-End-FCPA-Update.pdf.
68 SHEARMAN & STERLING LLP, FCPA DIGEST, at iv (2014), available at
http://www.shearman.com/~/media/Files/Services/FCPA/2014/January_2014_FCPA_Di
gestFCPA010614.pdf.
69 HUGHES HUBBARD & REED LLP, FCPA/ANTI-BRIBERY ALERT WINTER 2013
4 (2013), available at http://www.hugheshubbard.com/PublicationDocuments/
FCPA_Anti-Bribery_Alert_Summer_2012.pdf.
70 SHEARMAN& STERLING LLP, supra note 68, at vi.
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government collected over $2.5 billion in corporate penalties.71
Moreover, although historical FCPA actions largely targeted
manufacturing companies, modern enforcement efforts target a
wider range of industries, including pharmaceuticals, oil and
gas, retail, and banking and finance.72 Recent enforcement
trends also show an increase in actions against both foreign
companies and foreign nationals as a proportion of all actions
brought under the FCPA.73 DOJ Fraud Section Chief Jeffrey H.
Knox has said that “continued aggressive enforcement of [the
FCPA] . . . is exactly where we should be and where we are.”74
An important aspect of FCPA enforcement is that
almost every corporate FCPA action stems from voluntary
disclosures.75 Moreover, almost all corporate actions are settled
before trial, making litigation regarding corporate liability
relatively non-existent.76 In fact, many critics suggest that the
prevalence of settlements effectively relieves the government
from proving an actual FCPA case. This timidity allows the
SEC and DOJ to interpret the FCPA’s provisions however they
wish.77 The typical settlement with the government includes
either a deferred prosecution agreement (DPA) or a non-
prosecution agreement (NPA) between the corporation and the
government.78 The government usually agrees to a DPA or
NPA, without demanding an admission of guilt, in exchange for
a company’s agreement to fulfill certain requirements such as
paying a large fine or implementing various corporate
governance measures, including the use of independent
compliance monitors.79 In 2012, every FCPA enforcement action
was resolved with an NPA or DPA.80
71 Id.
72 Jonathan M. Karpoff et al., The Economics of Foreign Bribery: Evidence
from FCPA Enforcement Actions 44 (Jan. 23, 2014) (working paper), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1573222.
73 Mike Koehler, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Under the Microscope, 15
U. PA. J. BUS. L. 1, 9 (2012).
74 GIBSON DUNN, 2013 MID-YEAR FCPA UPDATE 19 (2013), available at
http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/Documents/2013-Mid-Year-FCPA-Update.pdf.
75 Id. at 15.
76 See id. at 18, 27; Irina Sivachenko, Note, Corporate Victims of “Victimless
Crime”: How the FCPA’s Statutory Ambiguity, Coupled with Strict Liability, Hurts
Businesses and Discourages Compliance, 54 B.C. L. REV. 393, 405-06 (2013).
77 Sivachenko, supra note 76, at 405-06.
78 Yockey, supra note 23, at 334.
79 Internal compliance monitors are instated for limited time periods, typically
three or four years, and oversee the implementation of new internal compliance programs
within a company at the company’s expense. See id. at 334-35.
80 Id. at 334.
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D. What Is “Corrupt Intent” and Why Is It a Problem for
FCPA Enforcement?
To impose liability under the FCPA, the government
must prove “corrupt intent.”81 Although the text of the statute
does not define “corrupt,” the accompanying Senate Report
provides that corrupt actions are those “intended to induce the
recipient to misuse his official position in order to wrongfully
direct business . . . or to obtain preferential legislation or a
favorable regulation.”82 The report further provides that “[t]he
word ‘corruptly’ connotes an evil motive or purpose [or] an
intent to wrongfully influence the recipient.”83 The FCPA’s
accompanying House Report additionally indicates that corrupt
actions involve a “quid-pro-quo element,” but the receipt of a
desired benefit is not required to impose liability.84
Notwithstanding the House and Senate interpretations,
the true meaning of “corrupt intent” in the FCPA remains
ambiguous to those governed by the statute and its continued
inclusion presents an opportunity for reform.85 Judicial
decisions provide little additional guidance to companies
involved in foreign business operations, as cases discussing the
“corrupt intent” element are rare and of limited assistance.86
The most helpful decision to date is Stichting Ter Behartiging
v. Schreiber, where the Second Circuit Court of Appeals noted
in dicta that the government must prove that an individual or
agent of a company entered into “a bribe-like transaction” in
order to impose corporate liability under the FCPA.87 The court
described such a transaction as one where an individual actor
“knew” they were engaging in prohibited conduct and not
simply making a mistake.88
81 RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 13, at 14 (referencing 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(a),
78dd-2(a), 78dd-3(a)).
82 S. REP. No. 95-114, at 10 (1977), available at http://www.justice.gov/
criminal/fraud/fcpa/history/1977/senaterpt-95-114.pdf (emphasis added); see also Allen
R. Brooks, Comment, A Corporate Catch-22: How Deferred and Non-Prosecution
Agreements Impede the Full Development of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 7 J.L.
ECON. & POL’Y 137, 144 (2010).
83 S. REP. No. 95-114, supra note 82, at 10.
84 Barta & Chapman, supra note 38, at 839 (discussing H.R. REP. No. 95-640,
at 8 (1977) available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/history/1977/
houseprt-95-640.pdf).
85 See Yockey, supra note 23, at 338. (noting that “several parts of the FCPA
appear vague or open to multiple interpretations[,] . . . includ[ing] the statute’s required
mental state, ‘corruptly,’ which remains undefined”).
86 See Stichting Ter Behartiging v. Schreiber, 327 F.3d 173, 181-83 (2d Cir. 2003).
87 Id. at 177.
88 Id.
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Following the decision in Stichting, industry groups and
business entities continued to seek clarification on the intent
required for corporate liability under the FCPA. None,
however, have gone so far as to suggest removal of the intent
requirement altogether.89 In 2012, the SEC and DOJ responded
to such requests for guidance.90 They released A Resource
Guide to the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (Resource
Guide), providing the limited explanation that “[t]he corrupt
intent requirement protects companies that engage in the
ordinary and legitimate promotion of their businesses while
targeting conduct that seeks to improperly induce officials into
misusing their positions.”91
Beyond this unsatisfactory comment, the document’s
“guidance” is limited to only a few brief hypothetical situations
showing “corrupt” conduct.92 For example, an executive explicitly
authorizing other employees “to pay ‘whoever [they] need to’ in a
foreign government to obtain a contract . . . violate[s] the
FCPA.”93 Additional examples include offering to pay for foreign
officials to travel first-class on “an all-expenses-paid, week-long
trip to Las Vegas” or “for a vacation to Paris for [an official] and
his girlfriend.”94 Examples of non-corrupt actions include giving
away free pens and t-shirts at a tradeshow booth or giving a
moderately priced wedding gift to a long-term business
associate.95 Although the SEC and DOJ attempt to provide
clarification with the above illustrations, these “examples are so
clearly on one side of the line or the other that they” do not offer
any real guidance for companies engaging in international
business transactions.96 Whether a more ambiguous action is
“corrupt,” such as conduct an individual believes is allowed
under the written laws of another country when it is in actuality
prohibited, remains unpredictable.97
In reality, determining whether someone acts corruptly
“requires a value judgment.”98 That is why, despite the
89 E.g., USCOC Letter, supra note 26, at 5.
90 See generally RESOURCEGUIDE, supra note 13.
91 Id. at 15.
92 Id. at 18.
93 Id. at 14.
94 Id. at 18.
95 Id. at 17.
96 Nora Whitehead, Corrupt Intent Under the New Guide to the FCPA:
Designing Best Practices in the Face of Continued Uncertainty, BLOOMBERG LAW (July 10,
2013), http://about.bloomberglaw.com/practitioner-contributions/corrupt-intent-under-
the-new-guide-to-the-fcpa-designing-best-practices-in-the-face-of-continued-uncertainty/.
97 Id.
98 Yockey, supra note 23, at 341.
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supposed guidance from the SEC and DOJ, the true meaning of
“corrupt intent” under the FCPA remains ambiguous.99 Such
ambiguities represent weak areas in the FCPA’s provisions,100
areas vulnerable to attack by those choosing to dispute the
charges made against them.101
The following example illustrates the ambiguity
surrounding the element of “corrupt intent.” The Resource Guide
provides that “proof of corrupt intent is” required to establish
corporate criminal or civil liability.102 Although this may appear
straightforward, in the two years since the Resource Guide’s
release, the sentence has received conflicting interpretations.103 In
a recent letter, the USCOC and over 30 other local, state, and
international business organizations stated their belief that this
sentence meant “that[ ] in order for a corporation to be held liable
for an anti-bribery violation, the corporation must act with
‘corrupt intent.’”104 A more common interpretation of this sentence
is that “corrupt intent” of the employee, and not the corporation,
is required to establish liability.105 The USCOC interpretation
would require the DOJ and SEC to prove that the corporate entity
itself, rather than an individual working for the corporation, acted
with “corrupt intent.” Without certainty as to the meaning of the
FCPA’s elements, it seems as though “the FCPA’s provisions
frequently mean simply what enforcement agencies want them
to mean.”106 Because the statute is exercised with such
flexibility, with decisions based on “a variety of factors” rather
than certain standards, enforcement could suffer dramatically
if agencies are actually held to their burden of proof.107
In fact, as enforcement increases, so do calls to
companies operating at the international level to hold the
99 Whitehead, supra note 96.
100 See ANDREW WEISSMAN & ALIXANDRA SMITH, U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL
REFORM, RESTORING BALANCE: PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE FOREIGN CORRUPT
PRACTICES ACT 6 (2010) (noting that the FCPA should be reformed to “make clear what is
and what is not a violation”).
101 See Kimberly A. Dunne & Alexis Miller Buese,Holding the Government to its
Burden of Proof in FCPA Cases: Litigating Jury Instructions, 2013 A.B.A.: WHITE COLLAR
CRIME 243 (2013), available at http://www.sidley.com/Holding-the-Government-to-its-
Burden-of-Proof-in-FCPA-Cases-Litigating-Jury-Instructions-03-01-2013/ (click “View
Article” hyperlink) (highlighting cases where defendants were not “willing to accept the
government’s aggressive pre-indictment demands” as “meaningful challenges” to the
scope of the FCPA).
102 RESOURCEGUIDE, supra note 13, at 14.
103 Compare USCOC Letter, supra note 26, at 5, withWhitehead, supra note 96.
104 USCOC Letter, supra note 26, at 5.
105 See Koehler, supra note 73, at 60.
106 Sivachenko, supra note 76, at 405-06.
107 Dunne & Miller, supra note 101, at 6; Yockey, supra note 23, at 342.
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government to its burden of proof on the ambiguous issue of
intent.108 Corporate lawyers are now beginning to highlight
that “it is critical that the government be required to prove that
a defendant [acted corruptly] . . . to avoid punishing someone
who unwittingly . . . violates the FCPA.”109 These
recommendations encourage business entities to look at the few
litigated FCPA cases as “meaningful challenges to the scope
and intent of the FCPA.”110 If the results of increased litigation
in corporate FCPA actions mirror the results of these prior
“meaningful challenges,” however, the impact on the U.S.
battle against foreign bribery could be devastating.
In the few FCPA cases to go to trial, courts have not
only found that the FCPA was indeed “amenable to more than
one reasonable interpretation and . . . ambiguous as a matter of
law,” but they have also taken issue with the DOJ’s and SEC’s
aggressive enforcement efforts.111 It seems that the
government’s historical reliance on settling claims undermines
its ability to overcome challenges when actually put to its
burden of proof at trial. In fact, Judge Howard Matz of the
Federal District Court for the Central District of California
famously threw out the only ever corporate conviction under
the FCPA.112 In dismissing the action, Judge “Matz cit[ed]
‘flagrant’ misconduct” on the part of the prosecution in its
attempt to secure a conviction that the evidence did not
substantiate.113 In a similar display of prosecutorial catastrophe,
the government was forced to dismiss a case against 12 business
executives accused of bribing Nigerian foreign officials after it
failed to secure convictions for the first 10 out of 22 defendants
charged with FCPA violations.114 In that case, Judge Richard J.
Leon of the Federal District Court for the District of Columbia
admonished the government, noting that its “very very
aggressive conspiracy theory . . . was push[ed] . . . to its
limits.”115 But with so few FCPA cases going to trial, the
108 Dunne & Miller, supra note 101, at 6.
109 Id.
110 Id. at 1.
111 United States v. Kay, 513 F.3d 432, 443 (5th Cir. 2007) (quoting United
States v. Kay, 359 F.3d 738, 746 (5th Cir. 2004)).
112 See Samuel Rubenfeld, U.S. Drops Appeal in Lindsey Manufacturing FCPA
Case, WALL ST. J. (May 29, 2012), http://blogs.wsj.com/corruption-currents/2012/05/29/
u-s-drops-appeal-in-lindsey-manufacturing-fcpa-case/.
113 Id.
114 Leslie Wayne, Bribery Case Falls Apart, and Tactics are Doubted, N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 23, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/24/business/fbi-bribery-case-
falls-apart-and-raises-questions.html?pagewanted=all.
115 Id.
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scrutiny exercised in these prior cases is often lacking. As seen
from the above examples, there are significant issues in
establishing liability when cases are actually litigated.116 If more
and more U.S. companies begin to litigate FCPA charges and
challenge the government to prove the elusive element of “corrupt
intent,” the war against foreign bribery is likely to falter.117
II. THE FCPA REFORMDEBATE
A. What Is the Debate?
Critiques of the FCPA come from an assortment of
entities including Congress, academics, businesses, public
interest groups, the judiciary, and the press.118 As explained
above, as enforcement of the FCPA increases, discussions of
potential reform correspondingly increase.119 Typically,
participants in the reform debate come from two conflicting
sides, those arguing for the maintenance of current
enforcement trends versus those arguing that the FCPA “is
vague, over-broad, and [ ] leads to confusion about what is legal
and what is illegal.”120 FCPA critics additionally claim that
“enforcement actions impose large and unwarranted costs of
firms” and simultaneously decrease the ability of U.S.
companies to compete internationally.121 Proponents of
increased FCPA enforcement argue “that bribery is pervasive
and that anti-bribery enforcement efforts are required to
decrease corruption” undermining societal values.122 Where one
stands in the reform debate—for either reducing or
maintaining the FCPA’s potency—depends largely on whether
one believes that the benefits of battling foreign bribery
outweigh the costs of enforcement actions.123
The USCOC is an influential party and consistently
advocates for FCPA reform.124 The USCOC’s main argument is
116 See id.
117 See, e.g., Dunne & Miller, supra note 101, at 6; USCOC Letter, supra
note 26, at 5.
118 Koehler, supra note 73, at 56.
119 Yockey, supra note 23, at 332.
120 Id. at 332, 338.
121 Karpoff et al., supra note 72, at 1; see also WEISSMAN & SMITH, supra
note 100, at 5-6.
122 Karpoff et al., supra note 72, at 1.
123 Yockey, supra note 23, at 340.
124 See generally USCOC Letter, supra note 26 (requesting clarification on
various FCPA sections); Letter from U.S. Chamber of Commerce et al. to Lanny A.
Breuer, Assistant Att’y Gen. & Robert Khuzami, Dir. of Enforcement, SEC (Feb. 21,
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that the FCPA is “an old law that is aggressively enforced.”125
Further, the USCOC highlights that, due to the prevalence of
settlements, the FCPA “lacks a history of case law” to clarify its
numerous ambiguous terms.126 Most recently, in a February 19,
2013 letter to the DOJ and SEC, the USCOC criticized the law’s
ambiguity and argued that FCPA over-enforcement damages the
competitiveness of U.S. businesses abroad.127 According to the
USCOC, U.S. companies face competition from businesses in
countries not subject to the FCPA.128 Fearing a competitive
disadvantage, U.S. companies may feel compelled to bribe
foreign public officials to maintain or obtain contracts.129
Those advocating for maintaining current enforcement
trends, such as Amnesty International and Human Rights
Watch, along with the DOJ and SEC, urge “that at this crucial
moment in history . . . [we] have no greater mission than to
work toward eradicating corruption across the globe.” 130 These
FCPA supporters believe “that the social benefits of combating
corruption outweigh any economic disadvantages that might
follow from . . . anti-bribery laws.”131 Numerous human rights
groups and other organizations argue that bribery destroys the
opportunity to create a fair and rational marketplace that
promotes legitimate competition. These advocates argue that
condoning corruption allows bribe-givers to circumvent
traditional market factors, like quality and service, that should
determine market prices.132 This increases the potential for
poor quality goods to infiltrate the marketplace “solely because
[their] proponent was able to pay off a government official.”133
Moreover, some argue that bribery-induced transactions create
2012), available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/82585638/Chamber-Letter-to-DOJ-SEC-
Regarding-FCPA-Guidance (same).
125 Samuel Rubenfeld, Chamber Picks Apart Guidance in Letter, Demands Statutory
FCPA Reform, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 19, 2013), http://blogs.wsj.com/corruption-
currents/2013/02/19/chamber-picks-apart-guidance-in-letter-demands-statutory-fcpa-reform/.
126 Id.
127 USCOCLetter, supra note 26, at 5; see also PUBLICCITIZEN, supra note 26, at 12.
128 WEISSMAN& SMITH, supra note 100, at 6.
129 Yockey, supra note 23, at 328-29.
130 Id. at 327, 338 (quoting Lanny Breuer, Assistant Att’y Gen., Address at the
American Bar Association 26th National Conference on the Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act (Nov. 8, 2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/pr/speeches/2011/crm-
speech-111108.html).
131 Id. at 340.
132 See Elizabeth Spahn, Nobody Gets Hurt?, 41 GEO. J. INT’L L. 861, 869
(2010); Cyavash Nasir Ahmadi, Note, Regulating the Regulators: A Solution to Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act Woes, 11 J. INT’L BUS. & L. 351, 364 (2012).
133 Ahmadi, supra note 132, at 364.
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a cyclical effect.134 For example, aside from the benefit
conferred to the bribe-giver, consider what happens after a
bribe is paid. “Economists ask, ‘[W]hat does a rational, self-
interest maximizing (and now corrupt) government official do
after he has just been bribed? He looks for more opportunities
to maximize his economic self-interest . . . .’”135 According to the
groups arguing for strong FCPA enforcement, this interest-
maximization strategy alters the decision-making process from
one that weighs traditional market factors to one grounded in
optimizing personal gain.136 Bribe-takers, searching for a
greater payout, will seek out those entities willing to give such
payouts and, in exchange, will guarantee future contracts,
delay or promote certain legislation, or let additional inferior
goods into the market.137 Further, such groups argue that “the
cost of doing business in a corrupt environment weighs heavily
on [a company’s] finances and business development.”138 Not
only is a corrupt environment detrimental to companies with
legitimate business practices already involved in a particular
market, but it also disincentivizes new businesses to enter into
such a market, as any entrant may become the instant target
of bribe-seekers.139 Overall, these groups emphasize that the
impact of bribery falls both on legitimate businesses
attempting to compete globally and on individuals forced to
consume sub-standard products around the globe.140
B. Choosing Sides: To Reform or Not to Reform?
Hindering both sides of the reform debate is a shortage of
information about the actual costs of foreign bribery.141 A new
model developed by Jonathan M. Karpoff, D. Scott Lee, and
Gerald S. Martin provides estimates of the true costs of
international bribery using data from FCPA enforcement actions
from 1978 through May 2013 (the Karpoff model).142 The model
clearly demonstrates that bribing foreign officials is still
profitable for U.S. companies. The costs of FCPA enforcement
134 See id. at 363-64.
135 Id.at 363.
136 Id. at 364.
137 Id. at 363-64.
138 Robinson, supra note 27, at 321; see also Hannay, supra note 1, at 5.
139 Ahmadi, supra note 132, at 364-65.
140 Hannay, supra note 1, at 5-6.
141 Karpoff et al., supra note 72, at 1.
142 Id. at 2. Karpoff works for the Foster School of Business, University of
Washington, Lee for the Lee Business School, University of Nevada Las Vegas, and
Martin for the Kogod School of Business, American University. Id. at 1, nn.a-c.
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actions is outweighed by the gain companies can attribute to
their corrupt practices. Taking this model into consideration, the
reform discussion, therefore, should not be limited to either
minimizing FCPA liability or maintaining the status quo.
Rather, a group advocating for an increase in FCPA liability
through the removal of the law’s “corrupt intent” standard, could
be a new voice that the current debate desperately needs.
Participants in the reform debate tend to focus on the
immediate costs of foreign bribery: settlement costs and the costs
attributed to the loss of business to entities not bound by the
FCPA.143 However, limiting the discussion to these costs, without
considering the potential benefits of foreign bribery, ignores the
reality that engaging in bribery remains profitable for
companies.144 While considering the costs associated with FCPA
enforcement actions, it is important to remember that detection of
bribery is largely based on self-reporting by firms, and without
such reporting, it is exceedingly difficult to uncover.145 Even the
use of industry wide “sweeps” by the DOJ and SEC, a more
reliable method for discovering bribery, requires spending a large
portion of the government’s limited resources and would
inevitably require cutbacks elsewhere.146 In fact, the Karpoff
model estimates that the probability of catching a company
engaging in bribery is only 6.4%.147 Taking into consideration the
costs paid by companies facing FCPA liability, such as direct costs
like fines, penalties, and internal investigations, as well as
indirect costs associated with reputational harm after a firm is
exposed, the estimated loss to a company facing only an FCPA-
based charge is 2.6% of their market capitalization.148 Coupling
the costs associated with enforcement actions along with the
likelihood of getting caught reveals “that firms engage in bribery
because it pays to bribe.”149 Therefore, although there is a strong
emphasis on the high costs of FCPA actions, a more accurate
reflection of those costs highlights that the costs are not high
enough to make bribery unprofitable.150
143 WEISSMAN& SMITH, supra note 100, at 5-6.
144 Karpoff et al., supra note 72, at 1-2.
145 Koehler, supra note 73, at 15-16. Yockey, supra note 23, at 347.
146 Yockey, supra note 23, at 347.
147 Karpoff et al., supra note 72, at 3.
148 Id.
149 Id.
150 Id. at 3-4.
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III. INTERNATIONAL ANTI-CORRUPTION EFFORTS
A. The Historic and Current Global Atmosphere
In addition to those advocating for reform at home, such
as the USCOC, global trends bolster the argument that the
FCPA is in need of reform. The FCPA was the only significant
piece of legislation targeting international corruption for nearly
20 years after its passage.151 In fact, for years Congress was
“interested in what might someday happen [if] our allies begin
to join [the U.S.]” in combating foreign bribery.152 Recent
international initiatives to prevent corruption in global
business transactions indicate that point in time has arrived.153
In today’s global marketplace, a company engaged in
international business is mistaken to focus solely on FCPA
compliance.154 In keeping with a growing international
consensus “that bribe givers and bribe takers are real criminals
doing real harm to real people,” both international conventions
and state legislation dealing with foreign bribery have increased
dramatically.155 As of 2012, 39 “major economic powers”
participated in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD) Anti-Bribery Convention and 170 nations
are currently parties to the United Nations Convention against
Corruption.156 Both conventions obligate their ratifying member
nations to outlaw the “bribery of foreign public officials in
international business transactions.”157 To meet these
151 Robinson, supra note 27, at 305.
152 Koehler, supra note 73, at 14-15 (quoting Senator Christopher Coons).
153 Barta & Chapman, supra note 38, at 850.
154 Hassan, supra note 22, at 1.
155 Elizabeth K. Spahn, Implementing Global Anti-Bribery Norms: From the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act to the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention to the U.N.
Convention Against Corruption, 23 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 1, 33 (2013); see also
Hassan, supra note 22, at 3-4.
156 United Nations Convention Against Corruption Signature and Ratification
Status as of 29 November 2013, UN OFFICE ON DRUGS & CRIME (Nov. 29, 2013),
https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CAC/signatories.html; Spahn, supra note 155, at 1.
157 OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in
International Business Transactions, OECD, http://www.oecd.org/corruption/
oecdantibriberyconvention.htm (last visited Mar. 22, 2014); United Nations Convention
Against Corruption, UN OFFICE ON DRUGS & CRIME, http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/
treaties/CAC/ (last visited Mar. 22, 2014). The European Union Convention Against
Corruption Involving Officials, the Inter-American Convention Against Corruption, and the
African Union Convention Preventing and Combating Corruption are a few of the more
regionalized international frameworks with motives similar to the OECD and UN
Conventions. See African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption, July
11, 2003, 43 I.L.M. 5, available at http://www.au.int/en/content/african-union-convention-
preventing-and-combating-corruption (click hyperlink for PDF); European Union
Convention on the Fight Against Corruption Involving Officials of the European
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obligations, numerous parties to the conventions recently
adopted legislation to prohibit bribing foreign officials.158 Other
nations are targeting foreign bribery without a specific
convention obligation to fulfill. For example, India, not a party to
either convention, has a bill prohibiting bribery of foreign
officials and officials of public international organizations
pending in its Parliament.159 Even countries with previously
enacted legislation prohibiting bribery of foreign officials,
including Ireland, China, and Spain, recently amended such
legislation to extend liability to business entities.160
Among the recent legislation battling foreign bribery,
two laws seemingly surpass the stringent nature of the FCPA:
the United Kingdom’s 2010 Bribery Act and Brazil’s 2013 Law
12.846, popularly known as the “Clean Companies Act”
(CCA).161 With the ratification of both acts, the “FCPA is no
longer the [international] benchmark for anti-bribery law
enforcement.”162 A recent joint-prosecution involving the U.S.
and the U.K. exemplified the FCPA’s diminished status when
the U.K.’s Lord Justice Thomas publicly characterized “the
[U.S.] as too soft in [its] anti-bribery enforcement efforts.”163
Unlike the FCPA, the U.K.’s Bribery Act provides for
potentially unlimited financial penalties, contains no exception
for facilitation payments, and creates strict corporate liability
for “fail[ure] to prevent bribery.”164 Similarly, Brazil’s CCA
Communities or Officials of Member States of the European Union, 26 May 1997, 1997,
1997 O.J.E.C. (C 195) 1, available at http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/
fight_against_fraud/fight_against_corruption/l33027_en.htm; Inter-American Convention
Against Corruption, Mar. 29, 1996, 35 I.L.M. 727, available at http://www.oas.org/
juridico/english/treaties/b-58.html.
158 Hassan, supra note 22, at 2. For example, Mexico, Ukraine, and Russia all
recently enacted or strengthened legislation dealing with foreign bribery of public officials.
Id. at 3-5; see also OECDWORKINGGROUP, PHASE 2 REPORT ON IMPLEMENTING THEOECD
ANTI-BRIBERY CONVENTION IN THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION 5 (2013), available at
http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/RussianFederationPhase2ReportEN.pdf.
159 Hassan, supra note 22, at 3.
160 Id. at 4-5.
161 Jon Jordan, Recent Developments in the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and
the New UK Bribery Act: A Global Trend Towards Greater Accountability in the
Prevention of Foreign Bribery, 7 N.Y.U. J. L. & BUS. 845, 846 (2011); New Brazilian Anti-
Bribery Statute, COVINGTON 1 (Aug. 9, 2013), http://www.cov.com/files/
Publication/83260639-b097-4908-843c-1434efafca9e/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/
8c7a9c35-5f0c-4e2f-9e12-168b79085722/New_Brazilian_Anti-Bribery_Statute.pdf.
162 Spahn, supra note 155, at 20-21.
163 Id. at 16-17. In a case against a Delaware manufacturer, the financial penalties
agreed to by the U.S. government were fairly low and Justice Thomas viewed the terms of
the settlement as “wholly inadequate in light of the” company’s actions. Id. at 17.
164 Michael L. Volkov, The Bribery Act: Raising the Enforcement Bar, WORLD
COMPLIANCE, available at http://fcpa-worldcompliance.com/pdf/raising-the-enforcement-
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provides for harsh penalties, strict liability, and contains no
exceptions or affirmative defenses.165
It is clear that the 1977 world, where the U.S. was the
sole combatant against foreign bribery, no longer exists. Rather,
anti-corruption and anti-bribery regulations are becoming more
standardized and stringent worldwide,166 evidencing a need for
both “broader, multijurisdictional compliance approaches” by
companies operating in more than one country and symmetry
among international anti-bribery efforts.167 Gaps in international
anti-corruption legislation create distinct challenges to domestic
efforts to combat corruption.168 The strict liability components of
the U.K. Bribery Act and Brazilian CCA are only two examples
of potential “gaps” in the FCPA that distance it from its more
rigid international counterparts.
B. Brazil’s Fight against Foreign Bribery
1. A History of Corruption in Brazil
“In the past it was only individuals that could be prosecuted for
corruption, which saved companies from the kind of punishment that
could threaten their operations.”169
Brazil’s reputation for battling corruption is historically
uninspiring. In a ranking of the world’s countries where bribes
are most likely to take place, Brazil ranks eighth, behind only
China, Nigeria, Iraq, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, India, and
Mexico.170 As recently as 2012, Brazil’s federal auditor’s office
terminated almost 4,000 employees for demanding bribes from
various individuals and business entities.171 Additionally, the
Brazilian government dismissed a former presidential aide in
2012 over allegations that he used his official influence to
bar.pdf (last visited Mar. 22, 2014). This is applicable to all business organizations for
the acts of their employees conducting any part of their business in the U.K. Id.
165 See infra Part III.B.
166 See generally Hassan, supra note 22 (discussing new international anti-
bribery legislation and how compliance with the FCPA is no longer enough for
companies hoping to mitigate liability for foreign corruption).
167 Id. at 1-2; see also Robinson, supra note 27, at 320.
168 Yockey, supra note 23, at 325.
169 Leo Torresan, Finally, Companies in Brazil Can Be Prosecuted for
Corruption, TRANSPARENCY INT’L (July 8, 2013), http://blog.transparency.org/2013/
07/08/finally-companies-in-brazil-can-be-prosecuted-for-corruption/.
170 Karpoff et al., supra note 72, at 14, 57.
171 Corruption by Country/Territory: Brazil, TRANSPARENCY INT’L,
http://www.transparency.org/country#BRA (last visited Mar. 22, 2014).
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obtain favors and preferential treatment.172 Public distrust in
government aligns with the country’s reputation. A 2013
survey shows that 81% of respondents felt that Brazilian
political parties were either “corrupt” or “extremely corrupt.”173
Widespread political protests in 2012 demanded that the
Brazilian government take charge in the area of corruption.174
Further, the OECD, to which Brazil became a party in 2002,
observed that Brazil’s efforts to combat corruption contained
“serious gap[s].”175 As a result of public protests, reprimand
from the OECD, and in preparation for notable upcoming
events,176 Brazil finally took actions toward eradicating
corporate corruption in August 2013.
2. The Clean Companies Act
With the official signature of Brazilian President Dilma
Vana Rousseff on August 1, 2013, Brazil officially joined the
growing global trend of combating bribery of foreign officials by
international companies.177 Its CCA imposes strict liability on
domestic and foreign corporate entities that engage in bribery
or other forms of corruption.178 The law only applies to those
entities with a registered office in Brazil.179 Prior to this
legislation, only individuals were liable for acts of foreign
bribery.180 The CCA came into effect on January 29, 2014.181
172 Id.
173 Global Corruption Barometer 2013, TRANSPARENCY INT’L,
http://www.transparency.org/gcb2013/country/?country=brazil, (last visited Mar. 22, 2014).
Similarly, a 2009 survey conducted by the International Finance Corporation of the World
Bank revealed that almost 70% of business owners and managers in Brazil identified
corruption as a major constraint to the operation of legitimate business. See Enterprise
Surveys, WORLD BANK INT’L FIN. CORP. (2009), http://www.enterprisesurveys.org/
Data/ExploreEconomies/2009/brazil.
174 New Brazilian Anti-Bribery Statute, supra note 161, at 1.
175 OECD, REPORT ON THE APPLICATION OF THE CONVENTION ON COMBATING
BRIBERY OF FOREIGN PUBLIC OFFICIALS IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS
AND THE 1997 RECOMMENDATION ON COMBATING BRIBERY IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS
TRANSACTIONS 4 (2007).
176 Brazil will host the 2014 FIFA World Cup and the 2016 Summer
Olympics. See Marcelo dos Santos Barradas Correia et al., A Comparison of the New
Brazilian Anticorruption Law, the FCPA, and the UK Bribery Act, ASS’N OF CORP.
COUNS., http://www.acc.com/legalresources/quickcounsel/cnbalfuba.cfm?makepdf=1
(last visited Mar. 22, 2014).
177 New Brazilian Anti-Bribery Statute, supra note 161, at 1.
178 Kelly B. Kramer et al., Brazil’s New Anti-Corruption Legislation, MAYER
BROWN JSM (Aug. 7, 2013), http://www.mayerbrown.com/Brazils-New-Anti-Corruption-
Legislation-08-07-2013/.
179 New Brazilian Anti-Bribery Statute, supra note 161, at 1.
180 Id.
181 Id.
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Although many of the CCA’s prohibitions mirror the
FCPA, Brazil’s law takes an extreme position with both
penalties and enforcement.182 The CCA imposes strict civil and
administrative liability for companies based on the conduct of
directors, officers, employees, and other agents acting on the
company’s behalf.183 Moreover, business entities are liable
under the Act “irrespective of the individual liability of the
natural persons” committing the corrupt act.184
The CCA prohibits a business entity, or its employees
and agents, from “promis[ing], offer[ing] or giv[ing], directly or
indirectly, an undue advantage [or improper benefit] to a public
official, or third person related to him [or her].”185 The Act
additionally prohibits “financing, funding, sponsoring or in any
way subsidizing” the conduct prohibited by the act, “using an
intermediary legal entity or individuals to conceal or disguise its
real interests or the identity of the beneficiaries of the
wrongdoings,” or “hindering or interfering with the investigations
or audits of public agencies, entities or agents.”186 The act also
prohibits companies defrauding the competitive nature of the
public bidding process or illegally benefitting from changes or
extensions of government contracts.187
The CCA “is a wake-up call for the management and
shareholders of Brazilian companies and will help ensure that
businesses do not bribe their way to contracts either here or
overseas.”188 Unlike the FCPA, the CCA does not require the
government to prove an individual acted with “corrupt intent.”189
Instead, liability is established “by showing that a director,
officer, employee or other agent committed a prohibited act to
benefit the corporation,” regardless of the agent’s intent.190
182 Id. at 2.
183 Id.; see also LAW. NO. 12,846 OF AUGUST 1, 2013, TRENCH, ROSSI E.
WATANABE ADVOGADOS 1, available at, http://www.corporatecomplianceforum.com/
files/Uploads/Documents/Spain/Compliance/Ley%20Brasil.pdf [hereinafter LAW 12,846]
(unofficial translation).
184 LAW 12,846, supra note 183, at 1. Like the FCPA, “[t]he responsibility of
the legal entity remains in the event of corporate changes, transformation, merger,
acquisition, or spin-off.” Id.
185 Id. at 2.
186 Jonathan Barr et al., The FCPA on Steroids: Brazil Ups the Ante in Fighting
Corporate Corruption, BAKERHOSTETLER (Aug. 12, 2013), http://www.bakerlaw.com/
alerts/the-fcpa-on-steroids-brazil-ups-the-ante-in-fighting-corporate-corruption-8-12-2013/.
187 LAW 12,846, supra note 183, at 2.
188 Torresan, supra note 169.
189 New Brazilian Anti-Bribery Statute, supra note 161, at 2; see also Santos
Barradas Correia, supra note 176.
190 Santos Barradas Correia, supra note 176.
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3. Penalties and Exceptions under the CCA
The CCA provides for “draconian” administrative and
civil penalties, but it does not impose criminal sanctions.191
Potential administrative penalties, imposed after administrative
proceedings, include: (1) fines between 0.1 and 20% of the
violator’s gross revenues from the year preceding initiation of
enforcement; and (2) publication of the decision.192 Potential civil
penalties, imposed through civil suits brought by the
government, include: (1) full disgorgement of illegally obtained
benefits; (2) forfeiture of assets, rights, or other values obtained
as a result of the wrongdoing; (3) partial or full suspension of
corporate activities; (4) compulsory dissolution; and (5)
debarment for one to five years, including prohibition from
receiving incentives, subsidies, grants, donations, or loans from
public financial institutions during the debarment period.193 When
imposing penalties, Brazilian authorities may take into
consideration a number of factors including: “[(1) t]he seriousness
of the offense; [(2) t]he advantage gained or intended by the
offender; . . . [(3)] the existence of internal mechanisms and
procedures; . . . [(4)] incentive[s] for reporting irregularities . . . [;
and (5)] effective enforcement of codes of ethics.”194
The existence of a strict liability component is not the
only difference between the CCA and FCPA. Unlike the FCPA,
Brazil’s law does not have an exception for facilitation
payments and does not include any affirmative defenses.195
Moreover, under the CCA, companies may take advantage of
formal leniency agreements, provided they self-disclose CCA
violations and fully cooperate with government investigations
and proceedings.196 To obtain such an agreement, the offending
191 Barr, supra note 186.
192 LAW 12,846, supra note 183, at 3. The fine “shall never be lower than the
advantage obtained.” Id. If a company is unable to calculate their gross earnings, the
penalty will range from 6 thousand reais to 60 million reais (or approximately 2700 to
26.3 million U.S. dollars). Id.; Barr, supra note 186.
193 LAW 12,846, supra note 183, at 3-4; Barr et al., supra note 186, at 2.
194 LAW 12,846, supra note 183, at 3-4. Other factors include: (1) “[w]hether the
offense was fully completed or not”; (2) “[t]he degree of damage, or risk of damage”; (3) “[t]he
negative effect produced by the offense”; (4) “[t]he offender’s economic situation”; (5) “[t]he
cooperation of the legal entity in the investigation of the wrongdoing”; and (6) “[t]he value of
the contracts held by the legal person with the public agency or entity damaged.” Id.
195 Juan Carlos Varela et al., Brazil’s New Anti-Corruption Law: What Every
Multinational Employer Should Know, ASAP: A TIMELY ANALYSIS OF LEGAL
DEVELOPMENTS (Littler Mendelson, P.C.), Aug. 22, 2013, at 2, available at
http://www.littler.com/publication-press/publication/brazils-new-anti-corruption-law-
what-every-multinational-employer-shou.
196 Barr et al., supra note 186, at 2.
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entity must be “the first one to come forward” with information,
“demonstrate its interest in cooperating with the investigation,”
“completely cease its involvement in the [ ] wrongdoing,”
“admit[ ] its participation in the wrongdoing,” “and fully and
permanently cooperate[ ] with the investigation and the
administrative proceeding . . . at its [own] expense.”197 Unlike
under the FCPA where cooperation results in an unknown and
potentially nonexistent benefit, a formal leniency agreement
under the CCA may provide “(i) up to a two-thirds reduction in
fines; (ii) a waiver of debarment [from participating in public
contracts]; and (iii) avoidance of government publication of its
decision with regard to the [alleged] conduct.”198
IV. BRAZIL: A MODEL FOR FCPA REFORM?
A. Time for Change
The competing camps in the FCPA reform debate
fundamentally disagree on the cost-benefit analysis of outlawing
bribery.199 The commonly cited costs to companies include
enforcement and internal investigation expenses, along with the
expense of losing business to foreign entities not subject to the
FCPA.200 As noted in Section II.B., such complaints against
increased enforcement purposefully overlook the important fact
that bribing foreign officials is often profitable.201 The benefits to
individual corporations stemming from foreign bribery,
especially when combined with the low possibility of being
caught, outweigh the potential costs associated with an FCPA
enforcement action.202 This demonstrates that the FCPA may not
be doing enough to eradicate such corruption. The Karpoff model
estimates that either imposed penalties must increase 9.2 times
or the probability of being sanctioned must increase by 58.5% in
order to make bribery unprofitable for companies in the
aggregate.203 Attempts to increase sanctions alone, without any
197 LAW 12,846, supra note 183, at 5.
198 Barr et al., supra note 186, at 2.
199 Yockey, supra note 23, at 340; see also supra Part II.A.
200 Karpoff et al., supra note 72, at 10.
201 Id. at 3.
202 See Karpoff et al., supra note 72, at 5.
203 Karpoff et al., supra note 72, at 5. (“This implies that bribery will continue
to be profitable . . . unless there is a substantial increase in the penalties for bribery or
the probability of getting caught, or both.”).
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increase in the probability of being sanctioned, may be
inadequate to successfully deter foreign bribery.204
Additionally, competition-based arguments against
stronger FCPA enforcement ignore the fact that anti-corruption
and anti-bribery regulations are becoming more standardized
worldwide.205 A narrow focus on the effects of the FCPA for
businesses’ international competitive ability is inadequate
because it does not consider the “marked increase” in other
nation’s anti-bribery laws, some of which are more stringent
than the FCPA.206 One cannot forget, however, that there are
still countries with either no legislation dealing with foreign
bribery or “little enforcement” of existing legislation.207 A
company in the Czech Republic,208 for example, with
international operations limited to the U.S. and countries
without adequate anti-bribery legislation, would realistically be
subject exclusively to the FCPA. Thus, despite the seeming
ubiquity of international legislation, for those companies
affected only by the FCPA, it is necessary to expand the scope of
the statute. Without strengthening its own laws to mirror
international trends increasing efforts to combat foreign bribery,
the U.S. risks becoming a safe haven for corrupt business
enterprises to blossom and enabling the erosion of “public
confidence” the FCPA was enacted to restore.209 This “could send
the wrong signal to other countries about the importance of
curbing bribery” and make the U.S. appear “soft on bribery.”210 A
solution that ensures an increase in successful enforcement
actions, while simultaneously strengthening the FCPA to mirror
international trends, such as removing the requirement of
“corrupt intent,” may be the best method to reach the “optimal
level of deterrence” required to fight foreign bribery.211
Those arguing for FCPA reform may argue that
imposing strict corporate liability for FCPA violations prevents
companies from engaging in activities that are “desirable” and
204 See Yockey, supra note 23, at 354.
205 See Hassan, supra note 22, at 2-4.
206 Id. at 1.
207 TRANSPARENCY INT’L, EXPORTING CORRUPTION?: COUNTRY ENFORCEMENT OF
THE OECD ANTI-BRIBERY CONVENTION PROGRESS REPORT 2012 15, 17 (2012), available at
http://www.transparency.org/whatwedo/pub/exporting_corruption_country_enforcement_
of_the_oecd_anti_bribery_conventio (click “Download the Report”).
208 Id. at 18.
209 RESOURCEGUIDE, supra note 13, at. 3.
210 Peter J. Henning, Taking Aim at the Foreign Corrupt Practice Act, N.Y.
TIMES, DEALB%K (Apr. 30, 2012, 1:55 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/
04/30/taking-aim-at-the-foreign-corrupt-practices-act/?_php=true&_type=blogs&_r=0.
211 Karpoff et al., supra note 72, at 5.
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“socially necessary” to engage in international commerce.212 A
similar argument is that a strict liability standard would
further hinder the competitiveness of U.S. companies with
international operations.213 Although such arguments are
expected, foreign bribery itself, and not its prohibition, destroys
incentives for new companies to enter into a corrupt market
place.214 Moreover, as the world becomes increasingly focused
on battling foreign bribery and continues to enact legislation
prohibiting it, arguments based on U.S. competiveness become
increasingly irrelevant.215
Additional questions may arise as to whether a country
like Brazil, notoriously corrupt, should really serve as a role
model for FCPA reform. This argument, however, overlooks
that the U.K., a country that often battles corruption side-by-
side with the U.S., also has an anti-bribery law imposeing
strict corporate liability.216 Although there are still considerable
uncertainties as to the effectiveness of strict liability in Brazil,
where the CCA only recently came into effect,217 or in the U.K.,
where the Bribery Act’s first prosecution started in September
of 2013,218 there is also no evidence suggesting its
ineffectiveness.
B. What Is Strict Liability?
A strict liability offense is an act that, if committed,
results in the imposition of liability without regard to an actor’s
intent in relation to one or more elements of the offense.219 In
the U.S., the strict liability penalty scheme is typically found in
certain criminal offenses, civil public welfare offenses, products
liability, and tortious conduct involving ultrahazardous
212 Laurie L. Levenson, Good Faith Defenses: Reshaping Strict Liability
Crimes, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 401, 426 (1993).
213 WEISSMAN& SMITH, supra note 100, at 6.
214 Ahmadi, supra note 132, at 364-65.
215 Hassan, supra note 22, at 1.
216 Sharifa G. Hunter, A Comparative Analysis of the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act and the U.K. Bribery Act, and the Practical Implications of Both on
International Business, 18 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 89, 98 (2011); see also Mythili
Raman, Acting Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dept. of Justice, Keynote Address at the
Global Anti-Corruption Congress (June 17, 2013), available at http://www.justice.gov/
criminal/pr/speeches/2013/crm-speech-130617.html.
217 Kramer, supra note 178.
218 Sarah Downey, Trial Begins in the SFO’s First Prosecution Under the UK Bribery
Act, LEGAL BUS. (Sept. 24, 2013, 9:38 AM), http://www.legalbusiness.co.uk/index.php/lb-blog-
view/1217-trial-begins-in-the-sfo-s-first-prosecution-under-the-uk-bribery-act.
219 Alan C. Michaels, Constitutional Innocence, 112 HARV. L. REV. 828, 830 (1999).
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activities.220 A strict liability regime for FCPA corporate
offenses would fit neatly within the category of public welfare
offenses.221 Strict liability classifications are common in the
areas of public health and safety regulations, where the need
for strict compliance with a law that protects the general public
is important enough to eliminate the need to prove intent.222 An
underlying assumption in strict liability statutes is that the
one facing liability is typically in the best position to prevent or
mitigate the violation.223
With strict liability offenses, “[s]ociety has made a
determination that it is better to hold persons responsible for
certain actions even without a showing of negligence because
the benefits derived . . . outweigh the burden placed upon a
defendant in a strict liability lawsuit.”224 Such benefits include
improved products, accountability, and safety.225 In terms of
corporate liability, the imposition of strict liability would
highlight “the failure of the organization to react, respond,
prevent, report, or engage in due diligence” or the failure of
“corporate policies and organizational decision-making.”226
There are several justifications to remove “corrupt
intent” as an element of FCPA liability for corporate offenses.
First, as noted above, making a party strictly liable “shifts the
risks” imposed by certain conduct “to those best able to prevent
a mishap.”227 A company whose employee or agent bribes a
foreign official is typically not without fault.228 In fact, as long
as the benefits of bribery are more than the cost of sanctions, it
is worth it for corporations to allow their employees to continue
to bribe foreign offices, as there is little incentive to try and
stop it at the managerial level.229 Further, among other factors
such as industry, firm size, and geographical operations, the
Karpoff model overwhelmingly shows that an aggressive
corporate culture is a common characteristic of bribe-paying
220 James R. MacAyeal, The Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act: The Correct Paradigm of Strict Liability and the
Problem of Individual Causation, 18 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 217, 218 (2001).
221 Id. at 222.
222 Id. at 223.
223 Id.
224 Curt Ward, What is Strict Liability?, BUTERA, BEAUSANG, COHEN, BRENNAN,
http://www.buteralaw.com/newsletters.asp?c=47&id=366 (last visited Mar. 22, 2014).
225 Id.
226 William S. Laufer, Corporate Bodies and Guilty Minds, 43 EMORY L.J.
648, 692 (1994).
227 Levenson, supra note 212, at 419.
228 Yockey, supra note 23, at 355-56.
229 Id. at 355.
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firms.230 While there are, of course, cases of “rogue” employees
involved in bribery despite the presence of compliance
programs within a company, FCPA violations do not always
occur in that manner.231 It is more common that bribery issues
stem from the environment and practices of the organization
itself.232 Empirical studies have shown that organizational
factors, including the typical downplaying of internal corporate
codes and intense corporate pressure to meet performance
goals, are more to blame for potential firm misconduct than
employee self-interest.233 “In reality, corrupt business practices
are often [a part of] very complex schemes . . . .”234 Taking this
into consideration, placing the blame on the entity rather than
exclusively on individuals may be an optimal method to send a
deterrence message and influence organizational culture.235
Second, corporate FCPA violations are analogous to
other areas applying strict liability in that such violations
generally involve conduct where the risk of injustice is
outweighed by the need for public protection. Further, the
violations typically come with a relatively minor punishment.236
Here, it is important to focus on the Karpoff model’s estimation
that companies charged with violating the FCPA typically only
lose 2.6% of their market capitalization as a result of
enforcement actions.237 Although this sounds severe, the
average value of a contract for which a bribe is paid is 3.55% of
a company’s market capitalization.238 Considering the relatively
low rate of detection, it is difficult to argue that the penalties
are excessive. There is a potential argument that companies
risk significant non-monetary backlash from violations of the
FCPA.239 Recent data shows, however, that firms suffer
negligible reputational harm based on bribery charges alone.240
Further, any effect on a company’s reputation can likely be
mitigated by the imposition of a sufficient compliance program
230 Karpoff et al., supra note 72, at 24.
231 Yockey, supra note 23, at 355-56.
232 Id. at 356.
233 Id.
234 Kovacich, supra note 3, at 530.
235 Yockey, supra note 23, at 356.
236 Levenson, supra note 212, at 422.
237 Karpoff et al., supra note 72, at 29.
238 Id. at 5.
239 Id. at 2 n.3.
240 Id. at 31 (noting that firms with co-mingled fraud charges experience large
reputational losses compared to negligible reputational losses for bribe-paying firms
without fraud charges).
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and appropriate public relations addressing the program.241
Although convictions under the FCPA could lead to
disqualification from government contracts, the applicability of
such a draconian sentence is a firm-dependent determination.242
Therefore, when the comparatively small loss and low
probability of being caught are analyzed in conjunction with the
benefits of preventing bribery to both the general public and
global businesses, the FCPA serves as an appropriate statute
for applying strict liability.243
Third, imposing strict corporate liability for FCPA
violations provides “a powerful public statement of legislative
intolerance for certain behavior.”244 At this point, it should be
clear that there are many costs associated with corruption and
foreign bribery.245 It is worth highlighting again, however, that
the impact of corruption and bribery falls on honest businesses
trying to compete globally as if there was a rational competitive
market as well as on consumers of sub-standard products of
every class worldwide.246 By applying strict corporate liability
and simultaneously increasing FCPA enforcement, the
message to U.S. companies and businesses operating in the
U.S. will be clear: bribery is simply not tolerated.
Fourth, imposing strict corporate liability on FCPA
violations will ensure that instances of comparable corruption
are handled similarly. As the ultimate effect of corruption’s
malfeasance on public welfare is likely the same, comparable
conduct should not yield varying sanctions.247 Currently,
because the SEC and DOJ Resource Guide’s examples of
“corrupt” conduct “are so clearly on one side of the line or the
other,” ambiguous conduct that is closer to the “line” could
easily inspire legal challenges to the meaning of “corrupt
intent.”248 With a lack of case law and limited guidance for
judges or juries to definitively label an action as “corrupt,” a
new string of challenges to the meaning of the term could
result in varying liability for conduct of comparable character
and effect.249 By removing the requirement for “corrupt intent,”
241 Yockey, supra note 23, at 346.
242 Id. at 349.
243 See supra Part II.A.
244 Levenson, supra note 212, at 422.
245 See supra Part II.B.
246 Spahn, supra note 155, at 10.
247 Levenson, supra note 212, at 421.
248 Whitehead, supra note 96, at 1; see also supra Part I.D.
249 See supra Part I.D; see also Stichting Ter Behartiging v. Schreiber, 327
F.3d 173, 181-83 (2d Cir. 2003).
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regulators could ensure that similar conduct would result in
similar FCPA liability.
Finally, the idea of imposing strict corporate liability for
violations of anti-bribery laws is not unique. Not only is this
evidenced by the passage of the CCA, but strict liability is also
imposed by the U.K. Bribery Act’s corporate offense for
“[f]ailing . . . to prevent bribery.”250 Much like the provisions of
Brazil’s law, the U.K. offense holds companies strictly liable if
a person associated with the organization “intends to obtain or
retain business for the organization or obtain or retain an
advantage in the conduct of business for the organization.”251
Applying a strict corporate liability regime would mean
that penalties could be imposed upon companies for inducing
improper acts with foreign officials, regardless of the intent of
the actor. The reformed version of the FCPA, exclusively in the
corporate context, would forbid:
Offering to pay, paying, promising to pay, or authorizing the payment of
money or anything of value, to certain individuals in order to influence
such individuals to act or make a decision in his or her official capacity
or to secure any other improper advantage in order to obtain or retain
business when acting for the benefit of the corporation.
Although, currently, corporate liability hinges on the corrupt
motive or purpose of an employee or agent, the revised version
would focus on the action of paying, offering to pay, promising
to pay, or authorizing a prohibited payment, regardless of the
intent behind the action.252
CONCLUSION
Combating foreign corporate bribery is a worldwide
concern and an increasing number of nations agree on the
disastrous effects that corruption wreaks on the global
marketplace and the world’s general population. An
examination of the U.S.’s legislation dealing with foreign
bribery, however, reveals that “basic legal and policy questions
remain as to the [true] purpose, scope, and effectiveness of the
250 Hunter, supra note 216, at 95.
251 Volkov, supra note 164.
252 As the Brazil Act only addresses entity and not individual liability, for
purposes of this note it is not considered whether “corrupt intent” should remain as a
requirement to impose civil sanctions on an individual. In order to impose criminal
liability on individuals, a finding of “willful intent” is required. See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-
2(g)(2)(A) (2012). It is worth noting, however, that currently, in order to impose criminal
or civil liability on companies, only a finding of “corrupt intent” is required, there is no
additional finding that the individual acted “willfully.” See id. § 78dd-2(g)(1)(A).
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FCPA and [current] enforcement.”253 Under the FCPA’s current
ambiguous construction and its regulators’ uncertain
enforcement practices, foreign bribery remains profitable for
companies.254 One solution proposed for FCPA reform is
legislative action to clarify the meaning of certain ambiguous
terms and to decrease enforcement efforts by the SEC and
DOJ.255 Others propose a continuation of heightened enforcement
practices that apply an unchanged FCPA.256 If and when Congress
considers reforming the FCPA, however, it should instead remove
the requirement of “corrupt intent” and impose strict corporate
liability. This change would not only eliminate the ambiguity of
“corrupt intent,” but also increase the government’s ability to
enforce the statute and adequately fight foreign bribery.
“If the fruits of corruption are denied to the corrupt, the
tendency to engage in corruption will be drastically reduced.”257
Congress enacted the FCPA with the intent to prohibit
companies conducting business within the U.S. from bribing
foreign officials. Though there have been significant efforts to
accomplish this purpose since the FCPA’s enactment, the time
has come to revamp the law to ensure that its purpose is
achieved in the most efficient way possible.
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